The 0.14 Percent Illusion: The Staking Fee Hidden Inside Morgan Stanley's New Ethereum and Solana ETPs

The hash is not the art; it is merely the key. I have repeated that sentence to myself since 2017, and it keeps becoming more useful as the crypto market grows more sophisticated. The press release from Morgan Stanley contains exactly the kind of number that looks like an answer when it is actually a doorway. The number is 0.14 percent. The announcement says both new exchange-traded products carry a 0.14 percent management fee, the lowest fee in their respective categories. On the surface, this makes the product sound cheaper than Grayscale's Mini Ethereum Trust, which charges 0.15 percent, and cheaper than Franklin Templeton's Solana fund, which charges 0.19 percent. But the arithmetic of an ETP can never be compressed into a single expense ratio. A management fee is one layer of a fee stack. Beneath that layer sits a second cost: the staking service fee. That fee is not disclosed in the headline. It is a percentage of the staking rewards, usually 15 to 25 percent, and it is paid before any cash reaches the shareholder. On a Solana product with a 7 percent network yield, a 20 percent staking fee costs 1.4 percent per year, which is ten times the 0.14 percent headline. The 'lowest fee' is a true statement about one line item and a misleading statement about the product's total cost. I do not want to be accused of pedantry. Staking service providers charge fees because they run real infrastructure. Validator nodes need to be updated, monitored, insured, and secured. Key management is expensive. But when a product is marketed purely on fee leadership, the omission of the staking fee is not a technicality. It is a structural blind spot. In this article, I want to dismantle the 0.14 percent narrative, look at the underlying staking mechanics of the Morgan Stanley Ethereum Trust and the Morgan Stanley Solana Trust, and show where the real risks live. Along the way, I will rely on observations from my own audit work in 2017, from my Python simulations of liquidity mechanics in 2020, and from the years I have spent reverse-engineering staking vaults and validator queue logic. Context: What Was Actually Launched The new products are not standard baskets of tokens. They are regulated exchange-traded products that combine spot exposure to Ethereum or Solana with an embedded staking operation. The Ethereum version, MSSE, plans to stake between 50 and 80 percent of its ETH. The Solana version, MSOL, may stake up to 100 percent of its SOL. The staking rewards are not reinvested automatically. Instead, they are converted into cash and distributed to shareholders monthly, or at least quarterly. The product structure is a deliberate translation of native blockchain yields into the familiar grammar of traditional income finance. The validator operations are delegated to three institutional staking providers: Figment, Galaxy Blockchain Infrastructure, and Coinbase Canada. Each provider is a major player. Each has experience running validators at scale. And each is a central point of failure in a product that is otherwise packaged as a liquid, diversified crypto exposure. The use of three providers is better than relying on one, but it is not the same as trust-minimized staking. A self-custody staker owns the validator keys and can exit the validator set without permission. An ETP cannot. The ETP outsources that power to a small cartel of node operators. The product also tracks the CoinDesk benchmark settlement rate. That index is a well-known reference price for digital assets, and using it is a standard institutional practice. However, a benchmark settlement price is not a continuous market price. In a global market that trades around the clock, the settlement rate is a snapshot. That snapshot may be close to actual transaction prices on a normal day, but it can diverge meaningfully during periods of high volatility or exchange fragmentation. This is a small detail in the prospectus and a large detail in the risk management of the product. The distribution machinery is what makes Morgan Stanley unusual. The ETPs will be sold through Morgan Stanley's network of more than 16,000 financial advisers, which collectively oversee roughly $7 trillion in client assets. This is not just a fund launch; it is a distribution event. The question is not whether Morgan Stanley can charge 0.14 percent. The question is whether those advisers will put the products on their recommended list, or whether the products will remain in an unsolicited corner where the compliance machinery allows only client-initiated requests. The difference between solicited and unsolicited is the difference between a product that flows and a product that merely exists. Core: The Fee Stack, Not the Fee Let me make the cost model explicit. Suppose the Ethereum Trust holds $1 billion in ETH. The management fee is 0.14 percent, so the trust pays $1.4 million per year to the sponsor. Suppose the trust stakes 65 percent of its assets, which is a typical midpoint between the 50 and 80 percent guidance. If Ethereum is delivering a 3 percent staking yield, the staked portion earns $19.5 million. A staking provider with a 20 percent commission takes $3.9 million. The remaining $15.6 million is distributed as cash to shareholders. Now compare the two fee numbers. The management fee is $1.4 million. The staking commission is $3.9 million. The staking fee is almost three times larger than the management fee. If the network yield is higher or if the staking ratio is higher, the staking fee can dwarf the management fee by an even larger margin. On the Solana side, assume $1 billion in SOL, a 6.5 percent network yield, and a 95 percent effective staking ratio. The gross staking yield is $61.75 million. A 20 percent fee costs $12.35 million. The 0.14 percent management fee is only $1.4 million. In this configuration, the staking fee is eight times the management fee. The product may still be cheap relative to competitors, but the cost seen by the investor is not the cost presented by the marketing team. What makes this even more slippery is that the staking provider fee has a nonlinear relationship with market conditions. If network yields go down, the staking fee goes down proportionately. But if network yields go up, the staking fee increases. In both cases, the 0.14 percent management fee remains flat. So the shareholder is not just exposed to the protocol yield; the shareholder is exposed to the fee rate charged by the staking provider, which is not disclosed in the expense ratio. I have audited staking contracts where the commission is applied to gross rewards, and I have seen contracts where the commission is applied after the network takes its slashing and penalty allocations. Each convention produces a different net yield. Without a standardized disclosure, comparing products on fee alone is arithmetic fiction. I want to be clear about one legal nuance. The announcement states that Morgan Stanley does not retain any staking rewards. That statement is true, but it does not imply that staking is free. It means that the sponsor takes no additional cut beyond the management fee. The validator provider takes a cut as an operating expense. In a fund's financial statement, that cut will appear somewhere in the expense line or the custody line. For an investor, the difference between 'the sponsor retains no rewards' and 'the staking ecosystem charges a fee' is the difference between a good headline and a complete answer. A Side Note on Cash Distribution The decision to pay staking rewards in cash, rather than accumulating them in the trust, is a product design choice with consequences. On the one hand, cash distributions create a clear income stream for investors. This is valuable for advisers who need to explain yield to clients. On the other hand, it sacrifices the compounding effect of reinvestment. A native staker who compounds rewards grows their principal over time. An ETP shareholder who receives cash and does not reinvest does not. Over a five-year horizon, the difference between compounding and collecting cash can be substantial. The product is optimizing for legibility, not for long-term total return. There is also a tax dimension. Cash distributions from staking rewards are taxable events. If the reward is paid monthly, the investor receives twelve taxable events per year. The complexity is manageable for a financial adviser, but it is not the same as holding the underlying asset and never receiving a cash flow. This is not a criticism; it is a warning. The same product that makes crypto yield look familiar to a traditional investor also makes the tax treatment more complicated than a simple buy-and-hold. The Staking Ratio as a Liquidity Budget The 50 to 80 percent staking range for Ethereum and the 100 percent maximum for Solana deserve more analysis than they get. Staking is not merely a yield-enhancement strategy. It is a liquidity conversion. When an asset is staked, it becomes illiquid for a period of time. On Ethereum, exiting a validator involves waiting for activation, waiting for the exit queue, and waiting for the withdrawal process. The total delay can range from minutes to days, depending on system load. On Solana, the deactivation process is shorter, but it still requires a two-epoch transition. A product that stakes a large share of its assets is trading immediate liquidity for yield. The choice of 50 to 80 percent on ETH is a recognition that the trust needs to cover redemptions without constantly unstaking. The 20 to 50 percent unstaked buffer is the trust's dry powder. A lower staking ratio means lower yield. A higher ratio means higher yield but greater redemption risk. A product designer chooses a point on that frontier. Morgan Stanley chose a range, which tells me they expect a relatively stable shareholder base. If they expected frequent redemptions, they would not offer an 80 percent upper bound. If they expected a long holding period, they might choose closer to 80 percent. The fact that the Solana product can stake 100 percent suggests they believe Solana's delegation and exit mechanics are manageable, or that the yield is attractive enough to justify the illiquidity. This is not a static decision. The trust's investment manager can adjust the staking ratio over time. That discretion is a risk. Two identical products with the same management fee can deliver different net returns if one manager chooses an aggressive staking ratio and the other chooses a conservative one. The fee number gives no visibility into this. The staking ratio is a risk parameter, and while it is disclosed as a target, it is not a promise. From my Python simulation work, I can explain why the choice of staking ratio interacts with the width of the redemption shock. In a normal market, redemptions are a few basis points of assets under management. In a stress event, redemptions can be several percentage points. If the trust has a 20 percent liquid buffer, it can survive a 10 percent redemption event without touching the staked assets. If the liquid buffer is only 5 percent, a 10 percent redemption shock forces the manager to begin the unstaking process. That process creates a delay, and during the delay the trust may be forced to sell liquid assets at the market price. If the market is falling, the sale pushes the market further down. The product may then trade at a discount to NAV, which can trigger more redemptions. This is the classic convexity spiral. Morgan Stanley's operational sophistication may prevent the spiral, but the product structure is not immune to it. Validators: Three Doors, One Key Let me say something about the validator triad. Figment, Galaxy Blockchain Infrastructure, and Coinbase Canada are all reputable. But the word 'reputable' is not the same as 'decentralized.' The product's entire staking function is controlled by three private keys, each held by a separate corporate entity. An attacker who compromises any one of those entities does not necessarily control all staked assets, but the trust's ability to respond to validator errors is concentrated. The network may still slash a validator if it misbehaves. Slashing risk is a known feature of proof-of-stake. In Ethereum, slashing can result in the loss of up to one-third of a validator's stake in the most extreme cases. On Solana, the consequences can also be severe, though the exact mechanics differ. A single slashing event can erase months of accumulated yield. The product wraps this risk in a traditional legal structure. The trust's prospectus will mention slashing. The staking provider may have insurance. But insurance is not a substitute for prevention. As a core protocol developer, I know that the difference between a healthy staking operation and a catastrophic one can be a single mistaken configuration in a validator's fee recipient address. In 2020, I spent a week reverse-engineering a staking vault's reward allocation logic, and I found a bug that would have sent all rewards to the fee collector. The code was correct for one ledger, incorrect for another. These are the kinds of bugs that do not show up in a marketing brochure. There is also the question of validator selection diversity. Three staking providers is a small sample. Each may run multiple validators, but they are likely to use similar hardware and software stacks. In an extreme event, such as a consensus bug that affects certain client implementations, all three providers could be impacted simultaneously. The risk is correlated across the providers because they share the same protocol layer. A truly diversified staking product would need to use more independent operators with different client software, different geographical jurisdictions, and different operational procedures. Morgan Stanley's choice falls short of that standard. Settlement Rates: The 7/24 Problem The CoinDesk benchmark settlement rate is used to calculate the NAV and to settle creation and redemption orders. For most investors, this is an invisible detail. But it has consequences. The crypto market is open around the clock. The settlement price is not a true last-trade price from a central limit order book; it is an aggregation of selected exchange prices at a specific time. In a liquid market, the difference between the settlement rate and the real-time price is small. In a market panic, the difference can be enormous. Cross-exchange arbitrage may fail when one exchange halts withdrawals or when decentralized exchanges have high latency. At that moment, the official NAV is a picture of the past, not a price at which the trust can transact. This is a structural mismatch between traditional finance's end-of-day NAV paradigm and the continuous nature of crypto. An ETP's authorized participant is supposed to arbitrage discrepancies between the market price and the NAV. If the NAV lags the real market, the arbitrage mechanism can become a source of additional price pressure. The product may trade at a premium or discount to NAV. In a stress event, that discount can be large. The 0.14 percent fee is irrelevant compared to a 2 percent discount in the secondary market. Investors should watch the premium/discount series for MSSE and MSOL, not just the fee. Distribution: The 7-Trillion-Dollar Pipeline The 16,000 financial advisers are the true product. Traditional asset managers like Grayscale have strong brands, but they do not sit in the same room as the client on a quarterly basis. Morgan Stanley's advisers do. They have access to retirement accounts, trusts, managed accounts, and the full machinery of financial planning. This is why I believe the ETP's real significance is not technical. It is distributional. The launch of MSBT, Morgan Stanley's earlier Bitcoin fund, gives us a useful baseline. MSBT launched in April, raised $34 million on its first day, and has accumulated roughly $390 million as of the most recent data point. That is not small, but it is modest relative to the size of Morgan Stanley's platform. It suggests that the product is still in the early stage of the adoption funnel. Financial advisers need to be educated. Compliance teams need to approve the product. Client suitability teams need to build model portfolios. The process is slow. The $390 million figure is a sign that the pipeline is functional, not that the pipeline is wide open. For MSSE and MSOL, I expect a similar early flow profile. The first few weeks may produce tens of millions of dollars in inflows, not billions. The market has already priced a large part of the news because Morgan Stanley's intentions have been rumored for months. The real opportunity will appear if and when Morgan Stanley puts these products on its solicited list. That step would allow advisers to recommend the products without waiting for client initiation. That is the moment when the $7 trillion distribution network starts to move. Without that status, the advisor count is mostly theoretical. Token Effects: Locked Supply and the Appearance of Exit One reason for bullishness is the entry of a large, regulated buyer. But let me trace the actual token-level impact. When a trust buys ETH or SOL, it takes custody of the underlying asset and removes it from the open market. If the trust then stakes a portion of those assets, the staked tokens are locked in a withdrawal or delegation mechanism. On Ethereum, staked ETH is not liquid in a true sense; it is locked until the validator exits. On Solana, staked SOL is still transferable if the stake is delegated, but deactivating the stake takes time. The aggregate effect is a reduction in the float available for trading. If Morgan Stanley's Ethereum trust accumulates, say, $2 billion in ETH and stakes 70 percent, that equals roughly $1.4 billion of ETH locked in validators. On Solana, a $2 billion trust staking 95 percent would lock up about $1.9 billion of SOL. These are not trivial numbers, but they are also not market-moving in a market with high daily volume. The more significant effect is the new demand channel. The ETP gives traditional investors a compliant way to hold crypto without touching a wallet. That creates new supply of buyers, but also new supply of sellers. The secondary market provides liquidity, so the inflow into the ETP is not a one-way peg. There is also a subtle governance effect. A large ETP with staking power becomes a constituent of the validator set. The staking providers control the voting power associated with the staked tokens. In protocol governance, this power can be used to support proposals. The ETP administrator may not participate in governance, but the staking providers can. That creates a delegation chain: retail shareholders supply tokens, the ETP supplies the staking mechanism, and the staking providers exercise the resulting governance power. This is a centralization of governance influence that is not visible in the product's marketing materials. It is one more way that 'passive' ownership is not truly passive. The MSBT Precedent: What a Bear-Market Launch Reveals Let me return to the context of the current market. The launch was described in relation to a bear-market launch for MSBT. That language matters. A product launched in a risk-off regime is a product that has to survive the trough of the cycle. When MSBT launched in April and later grew to $390 million, it proved that a large wirehouse could distribute crypto products even when sentiment was negative. That is an operational data point. It says that the compliance machinery works, and that client demand is not zero. A sideways or nervous market is often the best time to build positions in a new distribution channel. The flows are small, but the infrastructure is being tested. MSSE and MSOL will be tested in the same way. The first quarterly report will show whether the staking yield is actually converted into cash at the promised frequency, whether the fee stack remains invisible, and whether the product trades near its NAV. The first genuine stress test will come on the first day redemptions exceed the liquid buffer. Until then, the rally or dip in ETH and SOL caused by the announcement is not the signal. The signal is the product's operational performance in an environment where crypto still feels like a gamble to the average financial adviser. Contrarian: The Centralization That Works, Until It Does Not Now the contrarian argument. I have criticized the lack of decentralization in the staking arrangements. But perhaps the centralized, regulated ETP model is precisely what the industry needs to push crypto into the mainstream. Self-custody is a powerful ideal, but it is not accessible to everyone. A non-technical investor cannot be expected to manage validator keys, monitor slashing, and calculate staking rewards. The ETP offloads that complexity to a regulated professional. The staking providers are more accountable to the sponsor than a random anonymous validator. There is a paper trail, insurance, and an explicit contract. That is a meaningful improvement in operational safety compared to the early DeFi protocols I audited in 2017. Yet the contrarian argument cuts both ways. The same centralization that creates trust for traditional investors creates a systemic risk: if one of the three staking providers experiences a security incident, the entire trust could be frozen. A traditional investor can call a client service line, but the service line cannot stop the slashing event. The product creates an appearance of safety without eliminating the underlying protocol risk. The fee stack may be hidden, but the risk stack is also hidden. The word 'regulated' does not mean 'risk-free.' It means that the failure will be more orderly, not that the failure cannot happen. This is where my infrastructure skepticism is valuable. I have seen how 'institutional grade' products fail in novel ways. In 2017, the Golem token distribution contract had integer overflow flaws that were mathematically real but operationally ignored. The founders told me my analysis was 'too academic.' Years later, the same pattern shows up in fee disclosures. The 0.14 percent headline is mathematically true but operationally incomplete. It will be the same phrase again: too academic to matter, until the first quarter when the actual fee appears and clients ask why their yield was lower than expected. The lesson is not to avoid the product. The lesson is to separate the headline from the mechanics. A fee is a payment for a service. The staking fee is a payment for a complex service. Neither should be hidden. The product has real value as a bridge between traditional finance and on-chain yield. But the bridge is not magic; it is made of contracts, keys, and settlement rates. Those details are the infrastructure. The hash is not the art; it is merely the key. The custody is not the product; it is the liability. And the fee is not the cost; it is the door. The Next Layer: AI Agents and the Cash-Distribution Interface There is a forward-looking angle that most analysts will miss. As AI agents begin to participate in financial markets, they will need to understand cash distributions, staking yields, and redemption mechanics. The Morgan Stanley ETP is a human-first interface: cash distributions at monthly intervals, NAV reports, and an expense ratio. But the underlying staking operations are machine-native. An AI agent interacting with this product must parse a corporate action calendar, convert a benchmark settlement price into expected cash flow, and account for the staking fee that is not disclosed in the headline. I have been designing interfaces that allow AI models to sign transactions using zero-knowledge proofs, and I see a potential mismatch. The ETP is an off-chain contract that promises an on-chain yield. The staking providers are on-chain entities, but the distribution is off-chain. An AI agent that wants to optimize a portfolio cannot treat the product as a simple yield-bearing token. It must model the fee stack, the redemption delay, and the potential premium/discount. The products that succeed in the next cycle will be those that expose their operational parameters in machine-readable form. Morgan Stanley's ETP does not yet do that. The 0.14 percent fee is a human number, not a machine-readable fee schedule. Until the fee stack is disclosed with the same precision, AI-driven allocation models will be guessing. Stress-Testing the Fee Stack: A Simple Model Let me share a rough model from my simulation work. Suppose we are comparing two products: Product A charges 0.15 percent fee and stakes 0 percent. Product B charges 0.14 percent fee and stakes 70 percent with a 20 percent staking fee. For Product A, net yield is 0 percent minus 0.15 percent, which is negative 0.15 percent. For Product B, net yield is 70 percent times 3 percent times 80 percent, minus 0.14 percent, which is 1.68 percent minus 0.14 percent, or 1.54 percent. Product B is clearly better on yield, even after the hidden fee. But if the user is simply comparing fees, Product B looks cheaper. The fee comparison is anti-informative. The correct comparison is net-of-fee yield. The industry should publish a standardized 'total yield after all fees and expenses' number. Until then, the fee leadership narrative is a public-relations construct. This model also reveals a systemic risk. If the network yield declines sharply, Product B's net yield might fall below Product A's yield. At zero staking yield, Product B charges 0.14 percent plus any operational fees, while Product A charges 0.15 percent. The difference is tiny. But the expectation of staking yield is what justifies the lower management fee. If yields do not materialize, the product is not the cheapest product at all. In an environment where Ethereum issuance is low and transaction fees are suppressed, staking yields can fall below 1 percent. The 'lowest fee' claim then becomes a claim about a fee that is only part of a larger economic structure. Competition and the Race to the Bottom The launch of MSSE and MSOL at 0.14 percent is an escalation in the fee war. Grayscale's Mini Ethereum Trust is at 0.15 percent, and Franklin Templeton's Solana fund is at 0.19 percent. A 1 basis point difference matters for a large portfolio, but it is far less important than the structural differences in staking strategy and distribution. A product with a higher management fee but a lower staking fee could be better for the investor. The comparison should be total cost per unit of expected return. The current pricing behavior suggests that issuers are competing for first-day flows, not for long-term client outcomes. That is a familiar pattern in financial services, but it is dangerous for a product that includes a nonstandard cost structure. The race to the bottom also creates a selection problem. If fees are too low, issuers may be incentivized to cut corners in custody, staking, or insurance. A 0.14 percent fee does not leave much room for regulatory overhead, compliance, and independent audits. The staking providers need to be paid. The custodian needs to be paid. The sponsor needs to be paid. In order to offer a fee of 0.14 percent, the product must either operate at a scale that makes fixed costs negligible, or it must hide some costs by charging them through the staking fee. In Morgan Stanley's case, the staking fee is not hidden from the sponsor, but it is hidden from the headline. That is the trap of the fee war. Regulatory and Legal Layers There is another layer that is rarely discussed: the legal status of staking in the ETP structure. Yield-bearing crypto products have faced regulatory discomfort in various jurisdictions. The sponsors have carefully structured these products as trusts, not as investment companies, to avoid certain registration requirements. The staking reward may be treated as income, which changes the tax treatment. And because the product is a trust, some investor protections available in a registered fund are not available. This is not a criticism of Morgan Stanley; it reflects the regulatory constraints under which the product was built. But it means that the 'regulated product' label is not as strong as it sounds. When I look at the product from a protocol developer's perspective, what bothers me the most is the lack of a public, audited interface for the staking operation. The staking providers have their own contracts, but the ETP does not appear to have a transparent, open-source redemption queue. If an auditor cannot inspect the staking contract, the shareholder cannot verify the rewards calculation. This is contrary to the transparency promise of crypto. The product is a bridge between two worlds, but it may carry the opacity of the traditional world and the risk of the crypto world. The Custody Chain and the Missing Key Let's trace the custody chain. An investor buys a share of MSSE or MSOL. The sponsor uses a custodian to hold the underlying ETH or SOL. The custodian either controls the private keys directly or delegates to a sub-custodian. For staking, some of those assets are transferred to a staking provider's staking contract. The staking provider holds the validator keys. The original custodian may not have access to those keys. This creates a custody gap. During the staking process, the asset is no longer in the custodial wallet; it is in a staking contract controlled by a separate entity. If the staking contract has a bug, the custodian's insurance may not cover the loss. The investor's protection depends on who exactly held the keys at the time of the loss. This is one of the least understood risks in staking ETPs. I have seen this risk in my own audits. A plain token transfer is easy to verify. A staking operation is not. It involves a delegate function, a withdraw function, a split function, and a re-delegate function. Each function can be exploited if the contract is not carefully audited. The ETP's sponsor can review the staking provider's credentials, but cannot audit every line of the staking contract. This is why the final security of the product lies in the staking provider's operational discipline, not in the sponsor's legal documents. Market Timing and Sideways Positioning In a sideways market, investors tend to chase yield because capital appreciation is absent. The Morgan Stanley ETPs are a perfect fit for that behavior. The promise of monthly cash from staking is seductive. But the yield is not risk-free. It is a protocol-level yield that can go down when network activity declines. If Ethereum's fee market is weak, staking yields fall. If Solana's inflation is reduced, yields fall. The product is not a bond; it is a leveraged expression of network economics. The 0.14 percent fee is a stable cost; the staking yield is a variable return. In a sideways market, that variable return may not be enough to offset the price volatility of the underlying asset. A 6 percent staking yield is a small buffer against a 20 percent drawdown. This brings me to the positioning advice. This is not a market call. I do not predict the direction of ETH or SOL. I simply note that the marginal buyer from Morgan Stanley is attractive, but the marginal seller has more information about the product's actual fee stack than the average buyer. The product is a test of the traditional finance distribution network. The result of that test will not be visible in the first week or in the inflow numbers. It will be visible in the sustainability of the product's fee structure, in the stability of its NAV premium/discount, and in the degree of disclosure in its first annual report. Takeaway The right question to ask about Morgan Stanley's Ethereum and Solana ETPs is not whether they are good for the price of ETH or SOL. It is whether the disclosed fee is the true fee. Based on my experience with staking contracts and my years inside protocol mechanics, I can say with high confidence that the 0.14 percent figure is a headline, not a total cost. The staking provider fee is a real cost, and it is likely to be materially larger than the management fee on the Solana product and possibly on the Ethereum product as well. The first financial statement with a full fee disclosure will tell us more than any market analysis. Watch the 'other expenses' line. Watch the effective staking ratio. Watch the premium or discount to NAV during the first stress event. These are the data points that separate a product that is merely cheap from a product that is truly efficient. If Morgan Stanley wants to lead on fees, it should lead the industry by disclosing the staking fee in the same percentage basis as the management fee. That would be an innovation more valuable than another ETP. The hash is not the art; it is merely the key. The fee is not the cost; it is the door. And in a market like this, the door is open. Walk through now, but know what you are walking into.